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Hayward: The Federal Government as Cookie Inspector: The Consumer Privacy

LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS COOKIE
INSPECTOR: THE CONSUMER PRIVACY
PROTECTION ACT OF 2000
I. INTRODUCTION

Nearly every Internet user has at some point in time received a
commercial email message she does not remember soliciting, and
has most likely wondered how the sender was able to ascertain her
email address, much less her potential interest in the exciting offer
Even more common is the banner
contained therein.
advertisement that appears on commercial web sites, that seems to
know the exact age, gender, and income bracket of its target. For
example, subscription offers to magazines such as Details and
Maxim will appear to young adult male surfers, while links to
Internet personal ads will appear to known single users. The
explanation is simple: The advertisers know who you are and
where you are. Internet advertisers and e-commerce web sites
employ a technology known as "cookies" 1 to track exactly when
and where users log on to browsers in general and to certain web
Web advertisers often use a cookie's
sites in particular.
build a user profile based on the type of
to
pattern
transmission

1 Cookies work fairly simply. Web site proprietors - or more often, third
party Internet advertising agents - will transmit a text file to a user's personal
computer when that user is connected to a particular site. The file contains an
identification number that is matched with a user's Internet address, and the
number is transmitted back to its original sender with each subsequent visit by
the particular user. These files are sent and retrieved most often without the
user's knowledge, and more importantly, without the user's consent. See Will
Rodger, Activists Charge DoubleClick Double Cross: Web Users Have Lost
Privacy with the Drop of a Cookie, They Say, USATODAY.com Tech Report,
June 7, 2000 (visited Oct. 18, 2000) <http://vwwv.usatoday.com/life/
cyber/tech/cth2 11.com>.
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Web sites the user visits most frequently, and will use that profile
to target banner ads and email to that user every time she logs on.2
As with any rapidly advancing technology, the potential for
abuse exists. 3 Recent events in the business world have enabled
companies to match on-line profiles with personally identifying
information such as names and addresses. 4 The most conspicuous
example is the November 1999 merger of DoubleClick, the
world's most prominent Internet advertising firm, with Abacus
Direct, the keeper of the country's largest database of mail-order
customers. In January 2000, DoubleClick announced it would
begin associating users' names and addresses with data compiled
through its on-line tracking program. 6 According to a survey

2 Id.
3 A complaint filed by Michigan Attorney General Jennifer Granholm alleges
that one Internet advertiser compiles and sells its cookie-aided profiles to third
parties without users' knowledge or consent, and that such a practice amounts to
"little more than a secret, cyber wiretap." State of Michigan Attorney General
Press Release, Feb. 17, 2000 (visited March 1, 2000) <http://167.240.254.37/
AGWebSite/press release/pr1Ol64.htm>.
4 A complaint filed with the Federal Trade Commission against DoubleClick,
Inc. by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) claims that
DoubleClick's recent acquisition of Abacus Direct Corp. (a national catalog
company with a massive database of detailed contact information for numerous
subscribers) has enabled the company to combine its tracking data with
personally identifiable information. EPIC FTC Complaint (visited Oct. 27,
2000) <http://-vww.epic.org/privacy/intemet/ftc/DCLKcomplaint.pdf >. The
FTC recently announced that it would not continue its investigation,
acknowledging that DoubleClick has not begun to merge its online and offline
data. Bob Tedeschi, DoubleClick Seeks Ways to Protect Users' Anonymity, NY
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2001 (visited Jan. 31, 2001) <http://www.nytimes.com/2001
/01/29/technology/29ECOMMERCE.html>. However, the FTC did indicate
that the close of the investigation was "not to be construed as a determination
that a violation may not have occurred. Letter from Joel Winston, FTC Acting
Associate Director, to Christine Vamey, DoubleClick Counsel, dated Jan. 22,
2001.
5 Rodger, Activists Charge DoubleClick Double Cross, USATODAY.com
Tech Report, June 7, 2000 <http://wwvw.usatoday.com/life/cyber/tech/cth2l 1.
corn>.
6 Chris Oakes, DoubleClick Plan Falls Short, WIRED NEWS, Feb. 14, 2000
(visited Oct. 18, 2000) <http://www.wirednews.com/news/business/0,1367,
34337,00.html>.
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conducted by Business Week in March 2000, 82 % of Americans
fear that such practices could lead to their on-line activities being
associated with even more private information, such as credit data
and medical history.7 According to the same survey, 57 % of
those polled favored legislation regulating how personal
information is collected and used by e-marketers 8
In 1998, Congress enacted the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act, which makes it illegal for web site operators to
collect personal information from children under the age of
thirteen without express notice to and consent of a parent.9 The
European Union has enacted a similar law that requires businesses
to collect private data from European citizens only for clearly
stated purposes and which forbids data disclosure to third parties
without consumer permission.' 0 To date, no such legal restrictions
exist as to the gathering and use of personal data from adults in the
United States. Several recent resolutions by Congress have
proposed to remedy this situation. The most comprehensive
measure introduced is the Consumer Privacy Protection Act of
2000, sponsored by Senator Ernest "Fritz" Hollings."

I. BACKGROUND

A. Self-Regulatory Measures
In the Information Age, basic information as to a person's
whereabouts and preferences has become an extremely valuable

7 As summarized at the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) web site
(visited Oct. 20, 2000) <http://www.cdt.org/privacy/survey/fmdings>.
8 Id.
9 Pub. L. 105-277, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000).
10 Keith Perine, Not Enough Privacy?, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, July 10,
2000.
11 S. 2606 106th Cong. (2000).
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asset. 12 Businesses today keep detailed logs of consumers'
transactions, and target sales of particular goods or services to
individual consumers based on their past purchases. 13 Some
businesses in turn sell or rent their accumulated information to
other marketers. This simple practice was projected to generate $3
billion in revenue as early as 1994.14 Some e-commerce retailers
regularly and admittedly give or sell customer information to other
online partners, making sales contingent on consumers' consent to
the practice. 15 Some Internet search engines have for years
recorded their users' search terms and built profiles so they may
offer customized advertising and command higher rates from
Computer
advertisers seeking particular demographics. 16
user
identification
to
facilitate
attempted
hardware manufacturers
in 1999 when Intel announced that its latest model processor chip
would transmit an individual serial number over network
connections. 17 The signal would alert web marketers to a user's
presence as soon as a connection is established, and possibly allow
the marketers to discover the identity of the person to whom the
hardware was registered. 18 Web marketers often engage in a
practice known as "data mining," employing software to search
firms' databases for information that would prove useful to their
own store of knowledge. 19 Not surprisingly, most of this activity
occurs undetected by the average web surfer.2°
12 Jon Healey, The Promises of New Technologies Also Pose a Threat to
PersonalPrivacy, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY WKLY RPT, May 14, 1994, at
42.
13Id.
14 Id.
15 Jesse Berst, R.I.P. - The Death of Online Privacy, ZDNET, Oct. 16, 2000
(visited Oct. 18, 2000) <http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,
2641042-10,00.html>.
16 Id.
17 CDT, Privacy Issues (visited Oct. 20, 2000) <http://www.cdt.org/privacy/

issues/>.
18 Id.
19 Josh Duberman and Michael Beaudet, Privacy Perspectives for Online
Searchers: Confidentiality with Confidence?, SEARCHER, July/Aug. 2000,

<http://www.infotoday.com/searcher/julOO/duberman&beaudet.htm>.

"Data

mining" soffivare describes a class of database applications that discern hidden
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In an effort to avoid outright regulation, the industry has offered
to police itself, both individually and collectively. 21 DoubleClick
has acknowledged that it plans to use statistical models assembled
through the use of its cookies to deliver advertising messages to
online consumers identified by Abacus Online, its new
subsidiary. 22 The company also asserts through its privacy policy
that it will collect personally identifiable information only with
clear notice to and consent of users, and that information in the
merchants. 23
resulting database will not be disclosed to other
Finally, DoubleClick has vowed not to associate any personally
identifiable information it possesses with any identifiable medical,
users. 24
financial, or sexual preference information of individual
However, DoubleClick's business model is that of a vast
network of web operators who deal with individual users
directly. 25 These other operators within the network could
patterns in seemingly unrelated data. In a commercial setting, the software is
most often used by retail companies to find customers with common interests.
WEBOPEDIA (visited Oct. 25, 2000) <http://webopedia.intemet.com/TERM/d/
data-mining.html>.
20 DoubleClick, Inc. Form 10-K/A (Amendment No. 2) for Calendar Year
Ended Dec. 31, 1998.
21 Most web retailers and web-based companies display individual privacy
policies on their sites, setting out, in detail, what kind and how much personal
information the company intends to collect, what the information will be used
for, and consumers' options for retrieving, accessing, and retracting information
obtained from them. Other companies rely on specialty organizations to certify
their policies through "privacy seal" programs. Examples include the Better
Business Bureau Online <www.bbbonline.org> and Trust-E <www.truste.org>.
These programs evaluate a site's privacy policy for its adherence to privacy
standards prescribed by U.S. and international law. Once it has been determined
the site's policy is in compliance, the program will display a "privacy seal" on
the site's main page to certify that the site's policy meets minimum legal
standards. The seal organizations also serve as intermediaries in privacy
disputes, allowing consumers to report possible violations and working with the
certified company to ensure that its policies are not violated.
22 DoubleClick Privacy Policy, (visited Oct. 23, 2000) <http://www.
doubleclick.net/us/corporate/privacy/default.asp?asp__bject-l=&>
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 EPIC FTC complaint <http://wvv.epic.org/privacy/intemet/ftc/DCLK_
complaint.pdf>.
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conceivably synchronize their own cookie technology with that of
DoubleClick, allowing both parties to learn the identity of a
consumer and to pass the resulting information on to other network
participants almost instantaneously.2 6 Such an arrangement could
cause a user's personal information to be shared with several web
marketers when the user intended to disclose the information to
only one.27 Thus, the user would rarely be afforded an opportunity
to receive notice and give consent to the collection and use of her
personal information in the DoubleClick/Abacus network.28
Furthermore, DoubleClick has made no mention of the information
already possessed by Abacus at the time of the merger this past
June of 2000.29 It only offers access and opt-out measures to users
who voluntarily provide personal information via its network.3 °
There is no mention of a means by which consumers may retract
31
information acquired through DoubleClick's co-op partners.
Such a process would require each individual partner (who number
in the thousands) to provide opt-out measures. The logistical
impossibility of controlling the flow of personal information and
the inability to enforce the opt-out provision renders
Privacy
DoubleClick's privacy policy all but ineffective.
advocates have compared such measures by DoubleClick to an
innkeeper installing do-not-disturb signs instead of locks on guest
room doors.32
Commercial web publishers have initiated several programs to
try to establish a more comprehensive and uniform means of
providing Internet users with notice, consent, access, and security
as prerequisites for collection of personal information. 33 These

26 Junkbusters, "Open Letter 6/21 Asking the Companies (DoubleClick and
Abacus) to Abandon their Merger," (visited Oct. 18, 2000) <http://www.
junkbusters.com/htlen/doubleclick.html>.
27 Id.
28 EPIC FTC complaint <http://www.epic.org/privacy/intemet/ftc/DCLK_
complaint.pdf>.
29 See supra note 22.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See supra note 26.
33 See supra note 21.
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programs take the form of privacy seals, which are placed on
participating web sites to assure users of compliance with the
privacy policy standards set forth by the sponsoring
organizations. The most notable examples of such initiatives are
35
TRUSTe, Better Business Bureau Online, and SecureAssure,
who affix their seals of approval to sites that have met their
privacy standards, in exchange for reasonable fee.
The main criticism of such programs is that they have been
established and are funded by the very parties they claim to
oversee; a case of the fox guarding the hen-house. 36 Others claim
37
that the seal programs lack any real enforcement mechanisms.
The most severe penalty they may impose is withdrawal of a seal,
which rarely occurs even for flagrant violations. 38 Several e-tailers
have been found to violate their seal-certified promises not to
share customer information with third parties, without the seal
program ever knowing about it.39 Apparently, whistleblowers are
necessary in order for privacy violations to come to the attention of
industry regulators.
In one instance, TRUSTe did report a serious violation to the
Federal Trade Commission, which resulted in the FTC filing a
complaint against the participant.40 In that case, Toysmart.com
declared bankruptcy and sought to liquidate its assets. Among
In obtaining the
these assets was its customer database.
information contained therein, Toysmart.com assured its
customers their information would not be shared with third parties,

34 Id.
35 Id.

36 Berst, <http://www.zdnet.com/filters/printerfriendly/0,6061,264104210,00.html>.
37 Dubernan and Beaudet, <http://www.infotoday.com/searcher/jul00/
duberman&beaudet.htm>.
38Id.

39 Privacy? What's That?, TheStandard.com, Aug. 3, 2000 (visited Oct. 19,
2000) <http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0, 1151,17385,00.htmil>.
40 Stephanie Stoughton, FTC Sues Toysmart.com to Halt Data Sale;
Bankrupt E-Retailer Made Privacy Vow to Customers, BOSTON GLOBE, July 11,
2000, at E2.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

7

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 8

234

DEPAUL J ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XI:227

a practice that had been certified by TRUSTe. 4 1 Upon declaring
bankruptcy, Toysmart.com did in fact offer the database for sale.
TRUSTe learned of the situation through an anonymous tip and
42
reported it to the FTC, which subsequently filed a complaint.
The two sides reached a settlement agreement in July 2000, which
would allow Toysmart.com to sell the data under certain
circumstances.43 The decree was met with opposition by privacy
advocates and attorneys general, who claim that the customers
should be notified and have the option to have their information
agreed to a
deleted from the database. 44 Subsequently, the parties
45
database.
customer
the
of
subsidized destruction
This situation leaves one to wonder how effective industry selfregulation can truly be, given that the actual authority to sanction
privacy violations ultimately lies with the government. In effect,
the government, through the FTC, has been asked by TRUSTe to
enforce a TRUSTe policy violated by a third party. Having one
entity look to another to promulgate privacy policies and
subsequently having that second entity look to the government to
enforce those policies appears altogether convoluted and
inefficient. 46 When a system of self-policing apparently requires
enforcement by a middle man, its effectiveness is difficult to
discern. Further complicating the situation is the fact that many
online retailers "outsource" their information processing functions
to specialists in that area. 47 Such arrangements beg the question as

41 FTC Complaint against Toysmart.com (visited Oct. 21, 2000)
<http://legalnews.fmdlaw.com/cnn/docs/toysmart/toysmartcomplaint.html>.
42 Stoughton, Judge Declines to Rule on Toysmart Database;Stalls Sales of
CustomerInformation, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2000, at C2.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 As summarized by Junkbusters, "What's News at Junkbusters" (visited
Jan. 28, 2001) <http://www.junkbusters.com/ht/en/new.html#DCLK>.
46 CDT, "Existing Privacy Protections" (visited Jan. 30, 2001)
<http://www.cdt.org/privacy/guide/protect/>.
47 Toys R Us was recently named in a New Jersey class-action lawsuit for
outsourcing the data processing done through its web site to Coremetrics, a data
processing specialist, after stating in its privacy policy that the retailer would not
share customers' personal information with third parties without customer
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to which entities actually constitute third parties and which entities
are bound by and responsible for the enforcement of the operator's
privacy policy.
Further complications arise from the fact that sites bearing the
same seal may have substantially different privacy policies and
methods of enforcement. 4 Thus similar violations by different
companies may incur differing penalties or none at all. 49 Another
possibility would be that one seal program may sanction a certain
practice while another program allows it to go on unabated.5
Finally, skeptics maintain that an inherent conflict of interest
exists in entrusting industry-funded seal programs to police the
habits of their benefactors. 5 1 The entire concept of privacy seal
certification between private companies has been labeled by
Junkbusters president Jason Catlett as "a public relations52 and
lobbying effort" whose "main aim is to stave off legislation."

B ConsumerAction
Some measures of protection are accessible to the computer
savvy consumer who wishes to maintain her privacy.
Unfortunately, location and implementation of such measures
entail varying amounts of time, effort, and money,5 3luxuries which
are not always available to the average web surfer.
Anonymizer is a web-based company that provides privacy
protection software to users over the Internet. 4 These programs
consent. Junkbusters, "What's News at Junkbusters" (visited Jan. 28, 2001)
<http://www.junkbusters.com/htlen/new.html#DCLK>.
48 Duberman and Beaudet, <http://www.infotoday.com/searcher/julO0/
duberman&beaudet.htm>.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.

display/0,1151,17385,00.html>
52 <http://www.thestandard.com/article/
(visited Aug. 3, 2000).
53 CDT's Guide to Privacy Enhancing Technologies (visited Oct. 19, 2000)
<http:l/www.cdt.org/privacy/pet>.
54 Anonymizer.com Online Privacy Services (visited Oct. 20, 2000)
<http://www.anonymizer.com/services/index.shtml>.
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are downloadable and most often operate as plug-ins to web
The company offers a free service that
browser applications.
hides an individual user's IP address and removes cookies and
programs from a browser's cache while it is
other identifying
56
operating.
Anonymizer offers other protections on a fee per service basis.
Among these is a program called Safe Cookies which is used to
encrypt and conceal cookies sent to a user's hard drive via remote
web sites.57 Most web browsing applications include an option to
disable cookies, which allows users to refuse to accept cookies
sent to their hard drives from remote computers. However, some
of the more popular commercial web sites and portals require that
cookies be enabled and will deny access to users who refuse to
comply. 58 Smart Cookies allows users to access these sites by rerouting cookies to Anonymizer servers, which reformats and
while a user is
encrypts the cookie so that they may not be read 59
browser.
her
quits
user
a
when
disappear
and
online
Due to the varying practices and technology used in web
communications, programs like Safe Cookies do not always
function with some of the more frequently visited web sites and
portals. These programs and their ancillary equipment do not
always possess the speed and capacity necessary to intercept and
reformulate the varying numbers and sizes of cookies transmitted
by web servers. 60 As a result, users may experience very slow
download speeds61 on cookie-required sites or be denied access to
them altogether.
Another device that allows users to block cookies and other
uninvited communications is known as a proxy. A proxy is
essentially a third computer enlisted to filter communications from

55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Safe Cookies FAQ (visited Oct. 20, 2000) <http://www.anonymizer.

com/docs/faqs/safecookies.shtml>.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
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one computer to another.62 Anonymizer is an example of one such
a service. However, some of the more prominent providers of
Internet content, namely Microsoft, will not validate users whose
IP addresses the provider is not able identify and maintain.63
Hence, while proxies are effective in maintaining user anonymity,
they often hinder users in cases where identification is prerequisite
to accessing necessary web content.
Perhaps the most comprehensive technological privacy control
measure proposed to date is the Platform for Privacy Preferences
Project (P3P). P3P is basically a set of guidelines for webbrowsing software designed to provide users with a clearer
understanding of how personal information will be used by
particular web sites. 64 The platform also enables web site
operators to explain their privacy policies to users directly through
the browsing software: Once a user attempts to access a particular
site using P3P, the user will receive a message conveying that
site's practices regarding personal information. 65 The user then
may decide whether or not to proceed to the site.
While P3P does have the potential to increase greatly consumer
awareness as to the information practices of leading web
operators, 66 the platform was only recently introduced and as such
is not yet in wide use. 67 Furthermore, no authority exists to
mandate its use.6 8 Finally, while P3P may indeed serve to make
consumers more aware of the risks they incur when visiting
certain sites, it may ultimately be limiting in that consumers who
wish to protect their personal information will be deterred from

62 CDT's Guide to Privacy Enhancing Technologies, <http://www.cdt.org/
privacy/pet>.
63 Explanatory email from Microsoft Hotmail customer support to
Anonymizer (visited Oct. 20, 2000) <http://wvww.anonymizer.com/docs/
faqs/microsoft.txt>.

64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 References for P3P Implementations (visited Oct. 20, 2000) <http://www
.w3.org/P3P/implementations>.
68 Id.
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visiting sites they would otherwise access were the
option of doing so without divulging their information.

given an

C. FederalLegislation
Because the vast majority of web content providers and e-tailers
have proven neither ready nor willing to implement an industrywide and comprehensive means of self-regulation on privacy
matters, many privacy activists, private consumers, and even the
Federal Trade Commission have called for federal laws to
guarantee privacy protection online.70 Furthermore, the passage of
the EU Privacy Directive has inhibited the expansion of some emarketers whose privacy policies do not comply with European
law. This situation highlights the need for a comprehensive U.S.
law that would set minimum standards for consumer privacy on
the Internet and clarify jurisdictional discrepancies. 71 Such a law
does exist in the Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA), which regulates when and how much personal
information may be gathered from children under the age of
thirteen.72 However, no such protection is currently available for
adult users.73

69 EPIC, Pretty Poor Privacy: An Assessment of P3P and Internet Privacy

(visited Oct. 20, 2000) <http://www.epic.org/reports/prettypoorprivacy.html>.

70 Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of Marc Rotenberg,
EPIC Executive Director, before the Senate Commerce Committee, given Oct.
2,

2000

(visited

Oct.

testimony 1000.html>.

19,

2000)

<http://www.epic.org/privacy/intemet/

See also Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade

Commission on "Privacy Online: Fair Information Practices in the Electronic
marketplace," before the Senate Commerce Committee, given May 25, 2000
(visited Nov. 19, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/testimonyprivacy.htm>.
71 Duberman and Beaudet, <http://www.infotoday.com/searcher/julO0/
duberman&beaudet.htm>.
72 Pub. L. 105-277, 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000).
73 Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of Andrew Shen, EPIC
Policy Analyst, before the House Commerce Committee, given Oct. 11, 2000
(visited Oct. 19, 2000) <http://w-vw.epic.org/privacy/intemet/shen-testimony_
1000.html>.
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1. Children's OnlinePrivacyProtectionAct
Enacted in October 1998, the Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act has been met with relief on the part of parents and
confusion 74 and sometimes frustration on the part of web
The Act (COPPA) requires operators of web sites
operators.
directed to children and operators with actual knowledge that they
are collecting personal information from children to provide notice
on the web site of what information is collected and how it is
COPPA also requires that operators obtain verifiable
used.
76
parental consent before collecting or using such information.
Further, the Act requires that web site operators afford parents the
opportunity to review any information that sites have collected
from their children and to prohibit further use or maintenance of
children's information, a practice known in the industry as an "optout."'77 Finally, COPPA requires operators to maintain reasonable
procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of
the information they collect from children.78 The Federal Trade
Commission issued its final rule on COPPA in April 2000 and is
the agency authorized 79to bring enforcement actions for violations
of COPPA provisions.
Compliance with COPPA has been met with resistance by many
and by abject surprise by some. In October 2000, observers
discovered that web sites operated by the federal government were
soliciting personal information from children without requiring
parental consent beforehand. 80 For example, a White House site
invited children submit their names, ages, and addresses in email
messages to the President. 81 Sites operated by the EPA and NASA
74 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2000).
75 Id. at (b)(1)(A)(i).
76 Id. at (b)(1)(A)(ii).
77 Id. at (b)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii).
78 Id.at (b)(1)(D).
79 16 C.F.R. § 312 (2000).
80 D. Ian Hopper, Government Web Sites Don't Comply with Children's
Privacy Law, AP, Oct. 7, 2000 (visited Oct. 23, 2000) <http://www.sfgate.
com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/news/archive/20... /national0l 11EDT041.DT>.
81 Id.
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also collected identifying information from children who submit
art work as content for the sites.82 As enacted, COPPA is not
applicable to government sites, but a recent order from the Office
of Management and83Budget mandates that federal agencies comply
with its provisions.
Such phenomena have prompted indignation from operators of
private children's sites, some of whom have had to scale back
features such as email, chat rooms, and electronic bulletin boards
because of the high costs of obtaining and verifying parental
consent. 84 Hence the law seems to hit small scale operators much
harder than those with more ample resources. Also, the law could
be difficult to enforce against operators that are known to deal with
both adults and children, in that such operators would be required
the ages of users in order to be ensure
to differentiate
85
compliance.

2. Electronic CommunicationsPrivacy Act
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act was passed in 1986
as an amendment to the Federal Wiretap Act. 86 With regard to
personal information, the Act prohibits electronic service providers
from knowingly disclosing to any third party the contents of stored
communications. 87 However, the law contains an exception for
divulging the contents of such communications to an addressee or
intended recipient. 88 When users provide personal information to
web operators, the operators could be construed as the intended
recipients and would be allowed to do with the information what
they please. 89 As such, this law seems to have little to no effect on
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000).

87 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (2000).
88 Id. at (b)(1).
89 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (b)(5). Subsection (b)(5) provides an exception for any
communication "as may be necessarily incident to the rendition of the service or
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the information voluntarily provided to web operators, who may in
turn transfer90 personal data to third parties as intended recipients
themselves.

3.

The Gramm-Leach-BlileyAct

Passed as the Financial Services Modernization Act, the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in 1999 as means to
facilitate affiliation among banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies, principally by sharing information. 91 Title V of the
Act requires that financial institutions disclose their privacy
policies to affiliates and third parties and that they provide
consumers with the opportunity to opt-out of sharing their
information with nonaffiliated third parties. 92 On its face, this
measure could be seen to regulate the privacy practices of financial
institutions that do business online. 93 Again, however, the
legislation would apply only to a limited number of web operators
and leave many others to disregard any measure of privacy
protection.

94

to the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that service." This
provision seems subject to very broad interpretation, and as such, any number of
possible business purposes could fit within this exception.
90 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (b)(4). Subsection (b)(4) allows communications of
personal information "to a person employed or authorized or whose facilities are
used to forward such communication to its destination." This exception could
easily apply to third parties to whom web operators outsource their data
processing functions.
91 Pub. L. No. 106-102.
92 Id. at Sec. 502.
93 Financial Services Modernization Act Summary of Provisions,
<http://www.senate.gov/-banking/conf/grmleach.htm>. (visited Nov. 19, 2000)
94 Cecelia Kempler and Robert Woody, Living with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act, March 15, 2000, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae L.L.P. Insurance
Practice Group (visited Oct. 24, 2000) <http://wvw.insurelegal.com/living
with031500.html>. Privacy activists point out that the Act allows financial
institutions to share customer data with their affiliates and business partners,
which, Junkbusters points out, is "a polite way of describing anyone who will
give them enough money." Junkbusters, "What's News at Junkbusters,"
<http://www.junkbusters.com/ht/en/new.html#DCLK>.
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The FairCredit ReportingAct

Passed in 1970, the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) permits
information sharing within a corporate family of information
relating to transactions between financial affiliates and
consumers. 95 Under the Act, affiliates may share any information
that bears on a consumer's credit-worthiness provided they follow
a notice and opt-out procedure. 96 FCRA also requires that
consumers be able to access reports kept by credit institutions to
ensure their accuracy and completeness. 97 Again, though, this law
could have limited scope given98 the vast array of content and
service providers on the Internet.

D. State Legislation
In the wake of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, several states have
proposed similar legislation, most protecting consumer privacy
with respect to financial institutions and some extending protection
to a much larger commercial context. 99 States focusing their
situation include Arizona, Hawaii, Illinois, and
efforts on the latter
10 0
New Hampshire.
The Arizona bill would restrict the collection and disclosure of
personal information provided by consumers to "information
custodians," broadly defined as all entities that maintain and share

95 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
96 Id. at (b).
97 Id.
98 See supra note 94. The terms "affiliates" and "business partners" are open
to broad interpretation. Any number of web operators and other third parties
can and could qualify as business partners of vast credit providers. Kempler and
Woody, Living with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act <http://www.insurelegal.com/
livingwith031500.html>.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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personal data with others. 10 1 The bill requires these entities to
establish and disclose a privacy policy on the entities' web sites
and to allow consumers an option not to have their information
shared. 10 2 The bill would allow aggrieved parties to recover $500
per violation from entities who violate their policies, with treble
damages10 3awarded in cases where the violations are found to be
willful.
The Hawaii bill prohibits private enterprises from disclosing to
third parties any personal data collected about an individual unless
the individual gives express consent to have the information
released.10 4 The bill mandates that private entities collecting
personal information provide notice to consumers explaining the
purpose of the collection, the entities' planned use of such data, the
types of persons in the enterprise who will have access to the data,
where the data will be stored, and consumers' rights to access and
correct the information collected. 05 Intentional violations of the
bill's provisions would be treated as misdemeanors in criminal
incur civil damages ranging from $1,000 to $5,000
cases and could
06
per violation.'
An Illinois proposal prohibits state agencies and officials from
selling information regarding Illinois citizens to any entity for
commercial solicitation purposes. 0 7 Commercial solicitation
purposes under the bill include contacting individuals in order to
advertise, offering products or services for sale, or identifying
potential employees. 10 8 The bill requires commercial purchasers
of state databases to disclose the proposed use of the intended
purchase. 10 9 Failures to disclose the above-mentioned purposes or

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

H.R. 2717, 44th Leg. (Ariz. 2000).
Id.
Id.
H.R. 1232, 20th Leg. (Haw. 1999).
Id.
Id.
H.R. 69, 91st Gen. Assembly (Ill. 1999).
Id.
Id.
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misrepresentations
in such agreements are punishable as petty
11 0
offenses.
In New Hampshire, legislators have proposed creating an
executive state office on privacy.111 Under the bill the director of
said office would assure compliance with other provisions, mainly
the requirement that the state not disclose personal information 112
to
consent.
written
individual's
the
without
entities
private
Individuals may sue the state for violations of this provision and be
awarded compensatory damages as well as special damages in the
amount of $1,000 for each violation. The13 bill also provides
injunctive relief in lieu of monetary penalties.1

E. Litigation
Because of the ever-changing nature of communication
technology and the varying applicability of privacy principles to
the numerous different means of communication, much litigation
has arisen concerning businesses' use of customer information for
marketing purposes. In U.S. West Inc. v. FederalCommunications
Commission,114 the court of appeals for the Tenth Circuit heard a
petition for review of an FCC rule which restricted the use and
disclosure of and access to customer proprietary network
information (CPNI).- 5 The rule was initiated to implement
Section 222 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which
requires that telecommunications carriers only disclose
individually identifiable CPNI with the approval of the
customer.116 The statute also defined CPNI as information relating
to the quantity, type, and amount of use of a communications
service that is made available to the carrier solely by virtue of the
110 Id.
111 H.R. 1612-FN, 156th Gen. Ct. (N.H. 2000).
112 Id.

113 Id.
114 U.S. West Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, 182 F.3d 1224

(10th Cir. 1999).
115 Id. at 1228
116 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2000).
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carrier-customer relationship. 1 7 In essence, CPNI is information
regarding when, where, and to whom customers place calls, and as
such the court afforded it a high level of privacy protection. 118 In
this case, the petitioner, a telecommunications provider,
challenged the FCC regulation, claiming it was arbitrary and
capricious and violated the First Amendment protection afforded
commercial speech. 119 In particular, U.S. West objected to the
FCC's requirement that carriers employ an opt-in approach when
seeking and obtaining customer approval to share CPNI with
affiliated and non-affiliated businesses."19 The opt-in approach
entails obtaining express approval from a customer by written,
oral, or electronic means before using or disclosing that customer's
test, 120
information. The court, applying the Central Hudson
agreed with the petitioner and vacated the FCC order, holding that
sharing of CPNI between carriers constituted lawful and nonmisleading commercial speech, was related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience, and that the regulation
carriers' rights to free and unfettered commercial
implicated
12 1
speech.
Specifically, the court found that, despite the assumption that
customer calling patterns are a private matter and restricting access
to them could constitute a substantial government interest, the
FCC's approach to obtaining customer approval did not directly
and materially advance this interest and was not as narrowly
tailored as it should have been. 22 The court sided with U.S. West,
who advocated an opt-out approach as a less restrictive means of
117 Id. at § 222(f)(1)(A).
118 U.S. West, 182 F.3d at 1229, nl.
119 Id. at 1228.
119 47 C.F.R. § 64.2007(b).
120 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557 (1980). Central Hudson holds that governments may institute

regulations on commercial speech, provided it is neither misleading nor
advocating illegal activity, if: (1) there is a substantial government interest at

stake; (2)the regulations directly advances that government interest; and (3)the

regulations are narrowly tailored and not overly restrictive in fulfilling the
government interest
121 U.S. West, 182 F.3d 1224, 1231-1233.

122 Id. at 1237-1239.
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implementing the congressional restriction on sharing CPNI. This
approach merely requires carriers to provide customers with notice
and a
of their intent to use and share CPNI for marketing purposes,
12 3
use.
proposed
the
of
opt-out
to
customers
for
mechanism
The dissent employed a Chevron analysis 124 to arrive at the
conclusion that the FCC's approach was a reasonable
interpretation of the statute and that it did advance the substantial
state interest of protecting consumer privacy. 125 Moreover, the
dissent asserted that the opt-out approach did not meet the statute's
customer consent before use of CPNI
requirement of informed
26
allowed.1
be
would
The Eighth Circuit took a somewhat different approach to
telecommunications privacy in Van Bergen v. Minnesota.127 In
that case, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the state's enforcement of a
statute regulating automatic telephone dialing-announcing devices.
In particular, the law forbade the use of the devices by callers who
did not have a prior business or personal relationship with the call
recipient between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m.128 The
plaintiff, a gubernatorial candidate, planned to use automatic caller
devices to reach potential voters and provide them with a toll-free
number by which they could obtain more information about his
campaign. 12 9 Van Bergen argued that the statute was overbroad,
was content-based, and restricted access to a public forum, and
was therefore in violation of the First Amendment. The court
found that the law was a reasonable time, place, and manner
restriction which allowed telephone solicitors a 12-hour span in
123 Id. at 1240.
124 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984). Chevron governs statutory construction by executive agencies and
courts, and holds: (1) that legislative intent is clear when Congress has spoken
directly to the precise question at issue and that courts and agencies must give
effect to that intent; and (2) that when a statute is silent or ambiguous as to a
given issue, the question is whether the agency's interpretation is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.
125 US. West, 182 F.3d at 1246.
126 Id. at 1247.
127 59 F.3d 1541 (8th Cir. 1995).
128 Id. at 1546.
129 Id.
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which to ply their trade. 130 The court also found that the regulation
did not restrict automatic dialer calls based on content, but rather
on the existence or non-existence of the caller's prior relationship
with the recipient; the statute allowed automatic messages from
schools to students and parents as well as from employers to
employees because such entities necessarily have prior
relationships. 131 The law thus passed the test for content neutrality
established under Ward v. Rock Against Racism. 132 The court
further held that the telephone system was a private channel of
communication and that the government had a substantial interest
in protecting residential privacy from unsolicited and unconsentedto auto dialer calls. 1 33 Finally, the court concluded that the statute
was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on
commercial speech in that it placed only a minimal burden on auto
dialer callers to obtain recipient consent before sending a recorded
message during restricted hours, and that it left open numerous
alternative channels for speakers to reach their intended audience.
In reaching its decision, the Van Bergen court seemed to employ
the same reasoning as that used by the dissent in U. S. West.
Specifically, the Van Bergen court emphasized the recipient's
opportunity, or lack thereof, to indicate his or her desire to receive
automated telephone messages. 134 Based on this condition, the
court found that the government has a substantial interest in
protecting the privacy and tranquility of the home and the
efficiency of the workplace from the intrusive nature of these
calls. 135 Diverging from the U. S. West majority holding, the Van
Bergen court found that the regulation under review did not need
to be the least restrictive means of achieving the government

130 Id. at 1549.
131 Id. at 1550.

132 491 U.S. 781 (1989). Ward holds that governments may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of engaging in othenvise
protected speech provided that the restrictions are adequately justified and not
based on the content of the regulated speech.
133 Van Bergen, 59 F.3d at 1553-1555.
134 Id. at 1555.
135 Id.
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interest in order to meet
the narrow tailoring requirement of the
136
test.
Hudson
Central
In Conboy v. AT&T Corp.,137 the federal district court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed claims against the
defendant for violations of the privacy provisions of the
Telecommunications Act 13 8 and the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (FDCPA). 139 Plaintiffs were AT&T long distance customers
and alleged that AT&T disseminated their CPNI, phone bill
information, unlisted phone numbers, and billing names and
addresses to its credit card division and other entities without prior
consent. 140 Plaintiffs filed suit when representatives of AT&T's
credit card division repeatedly phoned plaintiffs' unlisted number
seeking information as to their daughter-in-law's whereabouts.
The calls came at all hours of the day, and one representative even
revealed that he knew the plaintiffs' unlisted personal information
and the details of their calling patterns.14 1 The plaintiffs claimed
these calls were the direct result of AT&T's sharing of customer
information with third parties and AT&T's failure
to provide
142
notice to customers that it engaged in such practices.
Plaintiffs brought suit under section 222 of the
Telecommunications Act, which, as stated in the U. S. West case,
restricts carriers in sharing CPNI with third parties without
customer approval. 143 The court dismissed the charge for failure to
state a claim, reasoning that the plaintiffs only paid a fee to their
local phone carrier to keep their information unlisted and gave no
such consideration to AT&T to do the same. 144 Although AT&T
was alleged to have violated the Telecommunications Act,
plaintiffs had no private right of action because they could not
demonstrate damages. The court reasoned that because plaintiffs
136 See Id. at note 13.

137 84 F. Supp. 2d 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
138 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
139 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2000).
140 Id. at 496.
141 Id. at 497.
142 Id.

143 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1).
144 Conboy, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 499.
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received all the services for which they paid AT&T - compliance
with the Act not among them - they suffered no personal damages
from AT&T's alleged noncompliance.1 45 The court also dismissed
a similar claim brought under FCC regulations promulgated under
the Telecommunications Act, which prevent communications
service providers from disclosing the billing name and address of
subscribers to third parties. 146 The court found no explicit or
implicit provision in the regulation allowing a private right147 of
action for violations, and therefore barred the plaintiffs' claim.
The plaintiffs brought another count under section 1692e(1 1) of
the FDCPA, which mandates that debt collectors disclose in their
initial communications with consumers that the collector is
attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will
be used for that purpose. 148 The court found that although AT&T
did fit the definition of a debt collector under the Act, the plaintiffs
were not the consumers the law seeks to protect, since they were
not the persons obligated to pay the debt being collected - their
daughter-in-law was. 1 49 Therefore, plaintiffs could not state a
claim under this section.
The court in Warner v. American Cablevision of Kansas City
Inc.150 held that all violations of the disclosure and record keeping
provisions of the Cable Communications Policy Act 15 1 are
actionable. The plaintiff, a former customer of the defendant,
brought suit under section 551 of the Act, which requires cable
operators to disclose to customers the personal information that the
operator retains, the purposes for which the information is
retained, the circumstances under which the information will be
disclosed to third parties, and the time after which the information
will be destroyed.

145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 499, 500.
47 C.F.R. § 64.1201(c)(2).
Conboy, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 500-502.
15 U.S.C. § 1692e(1 1) (2000).
Conboy, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 504.
699 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kan. 1988)

151 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2000).

152 Id. at § 551.
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In Warner, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant cable
company failed to provide him with any Section 551 disclosure
when the parties entered into a contract for cable service and that
the notice plaintiff eventually did receive was so vague as to be
violative of the Act's provisions.153 The court agreed, finding that
American violated the Act by failing to provide Warner with the
disclosure statement at the time of installation, and by failing to
specify the type of customer information retained, for what
purposes the information would be retained, to whom the
disclosed, and for how long the information
information might be
54
1
retained.
be
would
The defendant argued that, despite the fact that it did indeed
violate the disclosure requirement, Warner was not entitled to
damages because he had not suffered actual injury. 155 The court
disagreed and held that no showing of actual damages was
required for an aggrieved party to recover under the Act. 156 The
court based its reasoning on the Act itself, which states that "any
person aggrieved" by a cable operator's violation of Section 551
may bring a civil action and may recover a maximum of $1,000
per violation. 157 The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff
defendant, and awarded
was aggrieved by two violations by 1the
58
$2,000 in damages and attorneys fees.
Since no federal statute exists specifically regulating the
collection and dissemination of personal information (at least that
of consumers over the age of 13) via the Internet, some parties
resorted to litigating under federal unfair trade practice law, state
consumer protection and false advertising laws, and common law
claims of invasion of privacy and trespass to chattels.
In February 2000, in anticipation that DoubleClick Inc. would
merge its online profiles with the personally identifiable
information in Abacus-Direct's customer database, the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) filed a complaint against
153 Warner, 699 F. Supp. at 855-856.
154 Id. at 856-857.
155 Id. at 858.
156 Id.
157 47 U.S.C. § 551(f).
158 Warner,699 F. Supp. at 860.
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DoubleClick with the Federal Trade Commission. 15 9 EPIC stated
that its interests in the matter were the protection of individual
privacy and the danger that misuse of personal information posed
to opportunities for individuals to secure employment, insurance,
credit, medical services, and due process of law.16° EPIC also
outlined DoubleClick's frequent and sometimes drastic changes in
its privacy policy, which originally assured users that the company
had no knowledge of personally identifiable information of anyone
who visited a Web site in the company's network. The policy was
later altered to allow for collection of information identifying an
individual user's server and browser type, which would be shared
with third party advertisers.161 Upon completion of its merger with
Abacus Direct, DoubleClick announced that it would begin
associating names and addresses of users with its online profiles
through the use of a match code contained in its cookies.
Members of the newly formed Abacus Alliance (formerly the
DoubleClick Network) would post provisions on their Web site
giving users notice and choice as to the sharing of the compiled
information.1 62 EPIC emphasized that the majority of Internet
users who receive cookies from DoubleClick and already have
their information in the Abacus database never visit the Web sites
which detail the company's collection practices and explain
1 63
procedures for opting out of the information collection scheme.
EPIC brought its claim under Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, which
164
prohibits unfair or deceptive practices in or affecting commerce.
Specifically, EPIC alleged that: (1) DoubleClick publicly
represented that any user information it collected was and would
remain anonymous; and (2) DoubleClick intended to combine its
"anonymous" user information with users' names, addresses, and
purchase histories in its Abacus database. 165 The complaint further
alleged that DoubleClick's conduct was likely to cause substantial
159 See supra note 4.
160 Id. at2.

161 Id. at4, 5.
162 Id. at 7.
163 Id. at 8.

164 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2000).
165 See supra note 4 at 9, 10.
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injury to consumers, i.e. invasion of privacy, that was not
reasonably avoidable by consumers and was not outweighed by
countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. 166 EPIC
requested relief in the following forms: (1) an investigation into
DoubleClick's information collection and advertising practices; (2)
the destruction of user records created when DoubleClick and its
partners assured anonymity of such information; (3) an order to
DoubleClick to obtain express consent from any user about whom
it intended to create a personally-identifiable record; (4) civil
penalties in an amount equal to 50% of the revenues DoubleClick
obtained as a result of the practices alleged in the complaint; (5) a
permanent injunction against DoubleClick violating the FTC Act;
and (6) compensatory damages to redress
injury to consumers as a
67
violations.'
result of DoubleClick's
In the same week, Michigan Attorney General Jennifer
Granholm filed a notice of intended action to file a lawsuit under
the Michigan Consumer Protection Act. 168 Granholm alleged the
same facts EPIC did as to DoubleClick's conduct concerning its
data collection practices and its combination with Abacus Direct,
emphasizing the company's repeated changes of its privacy policy
as a "moving target."'169 Granholm claimed that DoubleClick's
opt-out method did not provide consumers with adequate notice
and choice as to the collection and use of personal information,
that the placement of cookies on users' computers was unknown
and unauthorized, that DoubleClick's promise that user
information would remain anonymous was false and misleading,
and that DoubleClick failed to disclose the intended use of the
information it collected and to obtain knowing consent from
consumers before gathering information. 170
Each of these
behaviors constituted a violation of the Michigan Consumer
Protection Act.171 Granhohn's complaint also alleged common
166 Id. at 10
167 Id. at 11.
168 MSA § 19.418(1).
169 State of Michigan Attorney General, Notice of Intended Action, AG File
No. 200002052, Feb. 17, 2000, at 7.

170 Id.
at 8.
171 Id.
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law claims of invasion of consumer privacy, conversion of
consumers' property rights in the value of their personal
information, trespass to chattels (i.e. DoubleClick's placement of
cookies on users' hard drives without their knowledge or consent),
and promissory estoppel in that consumers detrimentally relied on
DoubleClick's promises of user anonymity. 172 If DoubleClick did
not submit an assurance of discontinuance, Granholm stated she
would file suit seeking injunctive relief, civil penalties of up to
$25,000 for each violation of the Michigan Consumer Protection
behalf of Michigan consumers
Act, as well as a class action on 173
conduct.
DoubleClick's
by
injured
Around the same time as the previous actions were filed,
Harriett Judnick brought another suit against DoubleClick and 200
of its network affiliates in California state court. Again, Judnick
alleged the same facts concerning DoubleClick's collection and
disclosure of Internet users' personal information and sought relief
under claims of invasion of privacy and false and misleading
advertising. 174 Judnick's first count alleged that Internet users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy when visiting Web sites
and purchasing products online, and that DoubleClick and its
affiliates failed to provide users with adequate notice as to their
information collection practices, adequate means of preventing
collection of personal information, adequate means of reclaiming
information already collected, and adequate means of safeguarding
against inadvertent disclosure of information to unaffiliated third
parties. 175 Such conduct, plaintiff claimed, violated users' right to
privacy guaranteed under Article I, Section 1 of the California
Constitution 176 and constituted unlawful, misleading, fraudulent,
and unfair business practices under the California Business and
Professions Code. 177 Judnick also alleged that DoubleClick and its
affiliates were liable for false and misleading advertising in that
172 Id. at 8, 9
173 Id. at 13.
174 Judnick v. Doubleclick Inc. Complaint, filed Jan. 27, 2000, in Superior
Court of California, Marin County, Case No. 000421, at 3, 9.
175 Id. at 5-8.
176 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
177 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17204 (1999).
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they provided the public with assurances (via privacy policies) that
no user information was being collected, retained, or disclosed, but
required users to take affirmative steps to opt out of information
collection despite reasonable expectations by users (based on
place. 178
defendants' assurances) that no such practice was taking
In relief, the plaintiff sought to enjoin DoubleClick and its
affiliates from using cookies and related technology to identify
users without first obtaining consent; to require the defendants to
provide users with an easy mechanism to destroy mistakenly
gathered personal information and mistakenly created cookies or
mistakenly created links between the two; to require DoubleClick
to destroy all records personally identifiable user information
obtained without consent; and to require DoubleClick and its
affiliates to declare publicly and prominently that the company had
obtained personally identifiable user information without consent
information would not be acquired without
and that henceforth that
79
1
consent.
user
express
In March 2000, DoubleClick entered into settlement
negotiations with the aforementioned complainants.180 Litigation
seems to have stemmed since DoubleClick announced that it
would not pursue its previously disclosed plans to merge its online
identifiable information in the
profiling data with personally
181
database.
Direct
Abacus
In March 2001, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York dismissed a class action suit against
DoubleClick, holding that the plaintiffs in that case had failed to
state a viable claim.1 82 Specifically, the court found that the
178 See supra note 174 at 9, 10.
179 Id. at 10, 11.
180 DoubleClick in Settlement Discussions, CNET.com, March 23, 2000
(visited Feb. 25, 2001) <http://yahoofm.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-1582990.
html>.
181 Stefanie Olsen, FTC Drops Probe into DoubleClick Privacy Practices,
CNET.COm, Jan. 22, 2001 (visited
Feb. 25, 2001) <http://yahoofin.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-4563509.html>.
182 In Re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litigation, Case No. 00 Civ 0641 (NRB)
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). See Michael A. Riccardi, DoubleClick Can Keep Hand in
Cookie Jar,FederalJudge Rules, NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL, March 30, 2001
(visited March 30, 2001) <http://biz.yahoo.com/law/010330/62999-6.html>.
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plaintiffs failed to allege that DoubleClick gained unauthorized
access to their personal computers through its transmission of
cookies. 183 DoubleClick obtained legitimate access to users'
computers through the affiliated web sites within its advertising
network, the court stated. 184 Plaintiffs' submissions to these
affiliated web sites were intended and directed to those sites,
whose authorization was sufficient to justify DoubleClick's access
thereto, the court further held. 185 Finally, the court ruled that the
information gathered by DoubleClick was similar to that collected
on all consumers and that the value of such information
represented186no damage to consumers or unjust enrichment to
collectors.

III. PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION

The Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2000 (S. 2606) was
introduced the day after FTC issued its report to Congress1 87 and
for the purpose of preempting inconsistent state laws, establishing
a strong federal standard for online privacy, and ensuring business
certainty in the marketplace. 188 The bill incorporates the code of
fair information practices, established by the Health, Education,
and Welfare Advisory Committee on Automated Data Systems in
a 1973.189 These practices stress: 1) notice to and 2) consent by
the person whose information is being collected, 3) access to that
information by the person from whom it is collected, and 4)
security of collected information. 190 The bill's sponsor, Senator
Hollings, argued at its introduction that most Americans are
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 See supranote 70.
188 146 CONG. REC. S4299 (daily ed. May 23, 2000) (statement of Sen.
Hollings).
189 Id. See also EPIC, The Code of Fair Information Practices (visited Nov.
11, 2000) <www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/code fair info.html>.
190 146 CONG. REc. S4299.
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unaware of the threat the Internet can pose to consumer privacy,
and that others' fear of the loss of their privacy "represents the last
their full embrace of this exciting and promising
hurdle impeding
19 1
medium."
new
The bill advocates an opt-in approach to the collection of data,
as opposed to the opt-out approach currently in use and of which
many consumers are not aware. 192 The bill would also require
Internet companies to notify consumers of changes to their privacy
and information policies and not to use information gathered under
Furthermore, the act would compel
outdated policies. 193
companies to keep consumers' privacy preferences permanent,
would provide protection for whistleblowers whose companies
violate their privacy policies, would empower state attorneys
general to enforce the act's provisions on behalf of their
constituents, would provide a private right of action for consumers
harmed by the practices of data collectors, and would declare
asset in the case of a company
personal information not to be an194
bankruptcy.
declaring
collecting it
S. 2606 mandates that Internet users, when asked to divulge
personal information have: clear and conspicuous notice that
personal information is being collected; clear and conspicuous
notice as to the gatherer's intent in collecting the information; the
ability to control the extent to which personal information about
reuse,
them is collected; and the right to prohibit unauthorized use,
95
collected.1
information
the
of
disclosure, transfer, or sale
Title I of the bill prohibits Internet service providers (ISPs) and
commercial web site operators from collecting personally
identifiable user information without giving users clear and
conspicuous notice to users in a manner reasonable calculated to
provide actual notice to users that information is being collected.
Said notice must disclose: (1) what information will be collected;
(2) the methods employed in collecting and using personal
191
192
193
194
195

Id.
Id. at S4300.
Id. at S4301.

Id.
S. 2606, Findings, § 2 (16).
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information; and (3) all disclosure practices of the ISP or site
operator regarding the collected information, including disclosure
to third parties. 196 The bill further prohibits ISPs and web
operators from collecting information without users' affirmative
consent in advance. 197 S. 2606 orders ISPs and operators to
provide users reasonable access to their collected infonmation upon
to correct,
request as well as reasonable opportunity for users
198
collected.
information
any
delete, and supplement
Under the act, ISPs and web operators commit breaches of
privacy if they collect, disclose, or use personal information
without providing notice to or obtaining consent from the user and
if they know that the security, confidentiality, and integrity of user
personal information is compromised by an act or failure to act on
the part of ISPs or operators. 199 A provision of S. 2606 makes the
act applicable to third parties that use ISPs or commercial web
sites to collect information about users of the services or web
sites. 20 An entity like DoubleClick would constitute such a third
party.
The Act does limit liability for potential privacy breaches by
allowing ISPs and web operators to collect, disclose, and use
personal information "in order to protect the security and integrity
of the service or web site" or in order "to conduct a transaction or
to complete an arrangement for which a user has provided
information." Furthermore, ISPs and operators would not be liable
for disclosures made in good faith and following reasonable
procedures in responding to requests for disclosures of information
under COPPA to parents of children whose information has been
collected. 20 1 An exception also applies for disclosure of personal
granted on a
information in response to warrants or court orders
20 2
showing of compelling need for the information.

196 Id. at § 102 (a) (1)- (3).
197 Id. at § 102 (b).
198 Id. at § 102 (c).
199 Id. at § 102 (f) (1), (2).
200 Id. at § 102 (g).
201 Id. at § 104 (a), (b).
202 Id. at § 106.
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A breach of user privacy under the S. 2606 would be treated as
an unfair or deceptive trade practice for purposes of litigation and
enforcement by the FTC.2 ° Individuals harmed under the act
would have a private right of action to sue in state court to enjoin
violations and/or recover their actual monetary loss or $5,000 for
each violation, whichever is greater. 20 4 Courts would be allowed
of the
to award up to $50,000 for willful and knowing violations
205
act as well as punitive damages and attorneys fees.
Perhaps the most drastic measure contained in the bill is the
order to the FTC to establish the Office of Online Privacy to study
and monitor privacy issues concerning e-commerce and the
Internet as well as the operation and effectiveness of the act
This agency would report its findings and
itself.2 6
recommendations to the FTC and the House and Senate Commerce
Committees.
Similar bills were proposed in the 10 6th Congress by Senators
McCain and Toricelli. Senator McCain's bill, the Consumer
Internet Privacy Enhancement Act (S. 2928) would require web
operators to give notice of their information practices to users as
well as provide obvious opt-out mechanisms. 20 7 The bill would
also prevent the collection of personal information unless users are
given the opportunity to opt-out of disclosure of the information
and for use beyond the primary purpose for which it has been
collected. The Secure Online Communication Enforcement Act
(S. 2063), sponsored by Senator Toricelli, would amend Title 18 of

203 Id. at §§ 301, 302.
204 Id. at § 303.

205 Id.
206 Id. at § 307.
207 S. 2928, 106th Cong. (2000). The bill would forbid commercial web site

operators to collect personal information from users unless: (1) operators
provide detailed notice that information is being collected and for what purpose,
and (2) opportunities for users to limit use of the collected information for
marketing purposes. The bill provides a safe harbor for operators who comply
with self-regulatory guidelines issued by industry seal programs or approved by
the FTC. Noticeably absent from the text of the bill are liability for Internet
service providers and private rights of action for violations.
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the United States Code to extend restrictions on disclosure of
personal information to web site operators.2 °8
IV. ANALYSIS

Given at least one court's hostility to government
regulation mandating an opt-in approach to collection and sharing
personal information and patterns of
of consumers'
2 09 legislation like Senator Hollings' bill may face
communication,
harsh constitutional tests. However, courts tend to grant more
deference to measures specifically mandated by Congress than to
those promulgated by regulatory agencies. Such deference was
granted to the privacy measures contained in the Cable
Communications Policy Ac210 as well as to similar provisions in
the Telecommunications Act (just not to the particular rules
generated by the FCC under the Act).211

A. CentralHudson Test
In determining whether a restriction on the collection and
dispersal of consumer information would be constitutional, courts
would most likely construe the measure as a potential restriction
on commercial speech and apply a CentralHudson test, 212 as did
the Tenth Circuit in U.S. West. The test allows regulation on
commercial speech, provided it is neither misleading nor

208 S. 2063, 106th Cong. (2000). The bill would allow ISPs and web
operators to disclose personal user information to third parties only if the
disclosure is: (1) necessary to initiate, provide, and collect for access and/or
services rendered; (2) necessary to protect the rights or property of the provider;
(3) requested by the user; (4) made with the consent of the user at the time
disclosure is sought; or (5) required by law. The bill would place no restrictions
on ISPs' and operators' use or disclosure of aggregate user information (i.e.
anonymous on-line profiles).
209 See U.S. West, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
210 See Warner, 699 F. Supp. 851 (D. Kan. 1988).

211 U.S. West, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999).
212 CentralHudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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advocating illegal activity, if. (1) there is a substantial government
interest at stake; (2) the regulation directly advances that
government interest; and (3) the regulation is narrowly tailored and
13
not overly restrictive in fulfilling the government interest.2
Additionally, the restriction need not be the least restrictive one
conceivable, but merely reasonable in proportion to the interest
served.214
In the case of the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, the most
apparent government interest at stake is personal privacy, a right
established and reinforced in decisions such as Griswold v.
Connecticut?2 1 5 and Roe v. Wade.216 The bill's other stated
purposes are those of establishing a uniform standard for online
217
privacy and ensuring business certainty in the marketplace,
both obvious legitimate government interests. The Act directly
advances these interests in that it ensures consequences and
remedies for unlawful breaches of consumer privacy and by
establishing minimum uniform standards by which web operators
must abide with regard to collection and use of personal
information. Satisfying the third prong of the CentralHudson test
could prove problematic, especially if courts follow the Tenth
Circuit's precedent in U.S. West. In that case, the majority favored
an opt-out approach to the collection and sharing of consumer
information, as opposed to the opt-in approach espoused by the
Consumer Privacy Protection Act. The Tenth Circuit found that
the opt-in approach adopted by the FCC was not narrowly tailored
and impinged on communications providers' right to free and
unfettered commercial speech, and thus failed the Central Hudson
test's third prong. 218 However, the dissent in U.S. West argued that
the opt-out approach failed to fulfill the Congressional goal (as
stated in the Telecommunications Act) of informed consumer

213 Id.
214 Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480

(1989).
215 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
216 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

217 See supra note 188.
218 U.S. West, 182 F.3d 1224, 1237-39.
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2 19
consent to the collection and sharing of personal information.
Provided courts take notice of the Act's express goal of informed
consumer consent and grant it the status of legitimate government
interest, the opt-in method would likely be deemed to advance
directly consumer privacy and to do so in a reasonably narrowly
tailored manner.

B. Improvements overprior legislation
As made evident by the cases mentioned earlier this article,
current laws dealing with the collection, dispersal, and retention of
consumer personal information rarely provide consumers with a
private right of action, and in the rare case that a law does, it
usually only provides such a right to a very narrow class of
potential litigants.
Under U.S. West, courts appear loath to enforce regulatory
measures not specifically required by Congress (i.e., the FCC's
opt-in approach to collection and sharing of telephone customers'
22
personal data). 20 Courts also seem reluctant to allow suits under
laws which provide no private right of action for claims involving
disclosure of consumer information to third parties. In Conboy,
even though the court found that defendant may well have violated
an FCC regulation prohibiting disclosure of telephone customer
information to third parties, it determined that no private right of
action existed and thus barred the plaintiffs' claim.22 I In Warner,
the court allowed recovery only because a private right of action
Act.22 2
was explicitly stated in the Cable Communications Policy
Furthermore, as was illustrated by the recent decision of the
Southern District of New York,223 courts will not allow recovery
when plaintiffs are not able to prove any damages. Seemingly,
damages may be presumed when a statute provides a private right
219
220
221
222
223

Id. at 1247.
Id.
Conboy, 84 F. Supp. 2d 492, at 500-502.
Warner, 699 F. Supp. 851, at 858.
In Re DoubleClick,Case No. 00 Civ 0641.

Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016

35

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 11, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 8

262

DEPAUL J. ART. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. XI:227

224
of action, as the court did in applying the law at issue in Warner.
Finally, courts seem to be wary of involving third parties in the
relationships between consumers and primary service providers, in
which statutory obligations as to non-disclosure usually arise.
This was the case in Conboy, in which the court stated that a long
distance provider was not under the same obligation of nondisclosure was the local telephone service provider. 225 The same
approach was taken by the court in the class action suit against
DoubleClick, in which the court held that authorized access by one
party to a user's personal computer allowed access by additional
parties.226
The Consumer Privacy Protection Act could conceivably close
these apparent judicial loopholes for web operators. First, the act
specifically orders an opt-in approach to be employed in web
operators' information practices,
leaving no question as to the
preferred Congressional method of achieving the act's stated goal
and advancing its stated interest. Second, the court explicitly
grants consumers whose information is collected and shared in
violation of the act a private right of action, leaving no dispute as
to whether one exists or whether plaintiffs must prove damage
under tort or unfair trade practice theories. 228 Finally, the act states
that its provisions are applicable to third parties that use ISPs or
web sites to gather information regarding other users, solidifying
such parties' liability as to the collection and use of personal
consumer information. 229

C. Problems with similar legislativeproposals
The Consumer Internet Privacy Enhancement Act (S. 2928)
would certainly be an improvement over prior existing and
nonexisting federal and state laws. Of the Internet privacy bills to
224 699 F. Supp. 851, at 858.
225 Conboy, 84 F. Supp 2d 492, at 499.
226 In Re DoubleClick,Case No. 00 Civ. 0641.
227 S. 2606, Findings, § 2 (16).
228 Id. at § 303.
229 Id. at § 102 (g).
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come out of the 106th Congress, it provides the most
comprehensive and detailed and detailed requirements with
regards to notice to consumers of web operators' information
collection and use practices. 230 However, some experts have
argued that the amount of information required in such notices
could overwhelm Internet users, who tend to favor speed and
convenience when searching for information on commercial web
sites. 231 The act's emphasis on the notice provision of Fair
Information Practices comes at a cost to the principles of consent
and access, neither of which are explicitly given effect by the bill.
Furthermore, while S. 2928 does provide a number of civil
penalties for violations of its provisions, visibly absent from its
language is a private right of action by which consumers
themselves may enforce their right to privacy.2 32 Finally, the bill
provides a safe harbor for operators who comply with selfregulatory guidelines issued by industry group privacy seal
Such an allowance,
programs or the act's notice requirements.
especially in the absence of a private right of action, could leave
enforcement of privacy standards up to web operators themselves,
a practice whose effectiveness has proven unsatisfactory to the
public and to the FTC.2 34

230 S. 2928 § 2 (b) (1) (A) - (H). The Act would require operators to
disclose: their identifies as well as those of third parties whom the operator
knowingly permits to collect information through their sites; the types of
information likely to be collected; descriptions of how operators plan to use
such information, including availability to third parties; the categories of

potential recipients of information submitted; whether users must surrender
personal information in order to use web sites; descriptions of what steps
operators take to secure collected personal information; descriptions of means

by which users may elect not to have their information made available to third
parties; and contact information for web operators.
231 Prepared Testimony and Statement for the Record of Marc Rotenberg,
EPIC Executive Director, before the Senate Commerce Committee, given Oct.
2, 2000, <http://www.epic.org/privacy/intemet/testimony_1000.html>. (visited
Oct. 19, 2000)
232 Id.

233 S. 2928 § 2 (d) (1), (2).
234 See supra note 70.
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The Secure Online Communication Enforcement Act (S. 2063)
allows disclosure of personal information by web operators to nongovernment entities only if such disclosure is necessary to execute
a transaction related to the use of a site or service, necessary to
protect the rights or property of the operator, the disclosure is
made at the request or with the consent of a customer, or is
required by law.235 The act further provides that ISPs and web
operators may not refuse service to or access to users who refuse
to consent to the disclosure of their information. 236 However, S.
2063 specifically allows ISPs, web operators, and third parties to
use and disclose aggregate customer subscriber information from
which personally identifiable characteristics have been removed. 37
Such information, despite the fact that it may not be personally
identifiable, could include records of web sites visited and
transactions made by individual users, and would resemble, in
essence, the online profiles complied by companies like
DoubleClick, who use such information to target advertising and
commercial solicitations to those individuals. Coupled with its
lack of effort to incorporate all of the established Fair Information
Practices, the provisions of S. 2063 appear inadequate to meet the
privacy needs and expectations of current and potential Internet
users.

V. CONCLUSION

Although some Internet users may deem targeted web
advertising and commercial emails innocuous and merely
inconvenient, many relish the anonymity that the Internet can and,
many feel, should allow and maintain. Given that individual
privacy has been well established as a right in American
constitutional law, consumers should not need to resort to self-help
and the aid of third parties in guaranteeing their privacy. Privacyminded Internet users believe they should not have to seek out and
235 S. 2063 § 3 (b) (i)-(v).

236 Id. at § 3 (e).
237 Id. at § 3 (d).
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wade through pages of preferences in order to make clear to ISPs
and web operators exactly what information should and should not
be made available for all the world to see. Furthermore, advocates
believe that privacy should not come at the price paid for
downloadable software and other external measures, around which
backdoors are bound to be discovered sooner or later. Such beliefs
have been made evident by the rash of lawsuits filed by Internet
users in the past year, seeking to impose penalties on operators
who collect and share information without notice or consent.
These lawsuits have also made evident the need for a statutory
private right of action, since plaintiffs are rarely provided adequate
relief, if any at all, from the buying and selling of their identities
and their personal surfing habits.
Industry self-regulation has also failed to provide many users
with their desired minimum levels of privacy protection. Reports
and sanctions of seal program violations are few and far between,
and rarely result in any repercussions for the perpetrators. Further,
the standards for self-regulation can and do vary, and their
effectiveness can fluctuate according to the price paid for
certification. Individual state laws are equally likely to vary as to
minimum standards, and the fluid nature of Internet
communications is likely to cause problems as to determinations of
jurisdiction and the overall effectiveness of state enforcement.
The passage of a comprehensive federal law that incorporates
widely recognized privacy principles, establishes minimum
privacy standards, provides individuals with a private right of
action for breaches of privacy, and closes potential loopholes
would be a substantial step toward the solution of this problem.
The Consumer Privacy Protection Act does just that.

Ethan Hayward
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